Abstract. Password authentication remains to be the most common form of user authentication. So far, many strong-password authentication schemes based on hash functions have been proposed, however, none is sufficiently secure and efficient. Based on the analysis of attacks against OSPA(Optimal Strong Password Authentication) protocol, we present a hash-based StrongPassword mutual Authentication Scheme (SPAS), which is resistant to DoS attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and stolen-verifier attacks.
Introduction
Despite the existence of more secure means for user authentication, including smart cards and biometrics, password-only user authentication continues to be the most common means in use for its simplicity, convenience, non-hardware-dependence. The last two decades have seen a new family of password-based authentication protocols which can withstand offline dictionary attacks and thus support weak password, like DH-EKE, SPEKE, SRP, AMP, however, these protocols employ public key cryptography which is formidable for computationally limited user devices, like PDA and mobile phone. With the increasingly widespread of mobile applications, there is an increasing call for a secure password-only computationally-light user authentication protocol.
Halevi and Krawczyk [2] proved that public key techniques are unavoidable for password-based authentication protocols to resist off-line guessing attacks. To avoid offline dictionary attacks, using strong password is the effective way for users to avoid expensive public key cryptographic computations without using smart cards or other alternative devices. A strong password is a password with high entropy, thus cannot be guessed easily. In this paper, we deal with strong-password authentication which only employs computationally light functions such as hash and bit-wise exclusive OR operations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces related work, we review OSPA protocol as a typical example of hash-based authentication protocols and analyzes its flaws in section 3; the proposed SPAS scheme is introduced in
OSPA and its vulnerabilities
In this section, we will introduce OSPA protocol as a typical example of hash-based strong-password authentication protocols, and analyze its vulnerabilities to DoS attacks, stolen-verifier attacks and replay attacks. We use notations as in Table 1 . One salient feature of OSPA is that although user's password remains unchanged, the server's verifier should be changed after each successful authentication. This feature of dynamically changing verifier will bring another advantage: even if the server is compromised and the verifier is stolen, the intruder cannot use this verifier to impersonate legitimate user since the intruder cannot derive h(P⊕ T) from h 2 (P ⊕ T). However, OSPA actually cannot withstand this stolen-verifier attack, which will be discussed in the next section.
Stolen-verifier attack on OSPA
Stolen-verifier attack means when an adversary compromises a server and steals its verifier database, the adversary may take advantage of the knowledge of the stolen verifier to launch DoS attack, impersonation attack and replay attack. In OSPA, suppose an attacker has stolen the server's stored verifier h 1) ),the attacker then sends (ID A ,c 1 ,c 2 ',c 3 ') to the server to impersonate A to login. The server checks c 1 and concludes this is a legitimate user and finds the integrity protection of c 2 ' and c 3 ' holds, so that the server replaces h 2 (P ⊕ i) with h 2 (P'⊕ (i+1)) and set T=i+1. From now on, the legal user A will be rejected while the attacker gains the new password to impersonate the legitimate user. So the adversary succeeds in both stolen-verifier attack and DoS attack.
Replay attacks on OSPA
The attacker listens on the (i-1)th and ith authentication, then during the (i+1)th authentication, the attacker does the following:
Upon receiving the modified authentication material, since c 1 From now on, the attack can repeatedly send {h
(P ⊕ i)}to impersonate legitimate user, which can also succeed in DoS attack to prevent legitimate user to login.
Predictable T attacks on OSPA
The parameter T will be increased by 1 after each successful authentication thus it is predictable. After listening and recording all the authentication messages before the ith authentication, the attacker can impersonate the server to send the user T>i, so that the adversary can get user's future authentic authentication messages and impersonate legitimate user. Furthermore, since in OSPA, user does not authenticate server, any adversary sending arbitrary T to user can successfully impersonate server.
The Proposed Scheme-SPAS
In this section, we will present the Strong-Password Authentication Scheme (SPAS), which can overcome the security vulnerabilities of OSPA protocol. SPAS is composed of two phases: registration phase and authentication phase.
During registration phase, user A registers to server S via a secure channel, A computes V 1 =h 2 (S || P || N 1 ), where N 1 is the first nonce generated by S, S is the name of the server. The server stores ID A , N 1 and
, where k is S's secret key for all its clients, which should be stored under strict protection. 
Upon receiving step3 message, the server computes y 1 =d 1 ⊕ h 2 (S||P||N i ), and verifies whether h(y 1 ) equals h 2 (S||P||N i ), if this holds, the user is believed to be legitimate, and the server calculates y 2 =d 2 ⊕ y 1 , y 3 =h(y 2 ||N i ||N i+1 ), then verifies whether y 3 =d 3 holds, if this equation holds, the server replaces i with i+1, and stores SV i+1 =h(ID A ||k)⊕ y 2 , then sends h(N A ||N i+1 ||h 2 (S||P||N i )) to the user to complete the authentication. Finally, upon receiving h(N A || N i+1 || h 2 (S||P||N i )), the user verifies this value and assure there is no server impersonation attack on the other side if this verification result is right.
Security Analysis
Since we require users to choose strong password with high entropy, SPAS is resistant to offline dictionary attacks given that the adversaries' power is limited compared to the power required to break a large dictionary; also, SPAS can mitigate online password guessing by counting the number of failed authentications at the server side and taking measures when suspected attack occurs; since we do not employ an increasing T to randomize each authentication messages, SPAS is resistant to predictable T attacks; We claim that SPAS can also thwart the following attacks: replay attacks, DoS attacks, both user and server impersonation attacks, more resistant to stolen-verifier attacks compared with OSPA, and can achieve mutual authentication. We further analyze how SPAS resists these attacks as follows.
Replay attacks
Suppose the adversary sniffs all the communication information before the ith authentication, and tries to replay the old messages for the ith authentication. Because the computation of d 1 , d 2 , d 3 all includes nonce which is chosen randomly by the server during every new authentication time, there is no chance for adversaries to succeed by replaying the old d 1 , d 2 , d 3 . Furthermore. Also there is no chance for adversary to replace part of d 1 , d 2 , d 3 to launch replay attack since these three values are interrelated and any one of these three changes will cause the authentication failed.
Stolen-verifier attacks
In SPAS, we store SV i as a verifier into the server's verifier file. To derive verifier h 2 (P⊕ i), we need the server's secret key k to compute h 2 (P⊕ i)=SV i ⊕ h(ID A || k), therefore SPAS can resist stolen-verifier attacks as long as server's secret key k is kept secure. To the worst end, if k and the verifier file are both compromised, the protocol would be vulnerable to stolen-verifier attack, just like the same attack on OSPA, which requires the adversary to first compromise the server and get the server's verifier, then intercept a legitimate user's authentication messages and modify the old password to his/her chosen password.
DoS attacks
Suppose the adversary tries to change d 2 to launch DoS attacks, this attempt can not succeed since d 3 protects the integrity of d 2 , any modification made on legal d 1 , d 2 or d 3 will be detected by S. The reason that SPAS can avoid this attack while OSPA cannot is that SPAS involves different random nonces in calculating d 3 , while OSPA's message c 2 can be simply replaced by some calculation of former messages which can be verified by the former c 3 .
Impersonation attacks
User impersonation attacks are prevented since the previous messages sent on the communication channel cannot help an adversary in calculating authentication messages needed in his/her current authentication. We employ a changing verifier to avoid replay attacks and thus prevent user impersonation. Server impersonation attack is prevented by requiring server to send h(N A || N i+1 || h 2 (S||P||N i )) in step4 to prove that the server has the password verifier, and an adversary can not simply replay old messages to impersonate server because N A is random and unique for every authentication protocol run so that a server impersonator can not generate a valid step4 message to complete server authentication.
Conclusion
In summary, it is not an easy task to design a secure and efficient password authentication protocol without requiring the use of storage devices like smart cards or the use of public key cryptographic techniques. Based on the analysis of security flaws of a typical hash-based authentication protocol-OSPA, we present a hash-based StrongPassword Authentication Scheme (SPAS), which can achieve mutual authentication and is resistant to DoS attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and stolenverifier attacks.
